Transparency, belief, intention

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Transparency as Inference: Reply to Alex Byrne.Markos Valaris - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):319-324.
Knowledge of intention.Kieran Setiya - 2011 - In Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby & Frederick Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe's Intention. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. pp. 170--197.
Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.
Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Bratman. Oxford University Press.
Judgment as a Guide to Belief.Nicholas Silins - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2008 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Self-ascriptions of Belief and Transparency.Pascal Engel - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (4):593-610.
Two Objections to Moran’s Transparency Account.Julie Germein - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):735-740.
Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Moore-paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief and the Transparency of Belief.John N. Williams - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (1):9-12.
No Norm needed: On the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):499–516.
We-intentions revisited.Raimo Tuomela - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):327 - 369.
How we know what we intend.Sarah K. Paul - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):327-346.
The Desire‐Belief Account of Intention Explains Everything.Neil Sinhababu - 2012 - Noûs 47 (4):680-696.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-02-13

Downloads
756 (#20,026)

6 months
70 (#61,843)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

II—Matthew Boyle: Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.
Transparency and reflection.Matthew Boyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):1012-1039.
Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
Self‐Knowledge and Rational Agency: A Defense of Empiricism.Brie Gertler - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):91-109.

View all 83 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

View all 71 references / Add more references