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Transparency and Self-Knowledge
Oxford University Press (2018)
Abstract
You know what someone else is thinking and feeling by observing them. But how do you know what you are thinking and feeling? This is the problem of self-knowledge: Alex Byrne tries to solve it. The idea is that you know this not by taking a special kind of look at your own mind, but by an inference from a premise about your environment.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Explainable AI lacks regulative reasons: why AI and human decision‑making are not equally opaque.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - AI and Ethics.
Consciousness meets Lewisian interpretation theory: A multistage account of intentionality.Adam Pautz - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1.
Can We Perceive the Past?E. J. Green - forthcoming - In Sara Aronowitz & Lynn Nadel (eds.), Space, Time, and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
References found in this work
Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.
Inferential Justification and the Transparency of Belief.David James Barnett - 2016 - Noûs 50 (1):184-212.
Safety, content, apriority, self-knowledge.David Manley - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.
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