James's Theory of Truth as a Theory of Knowledge

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 20 (3):253 - 267 (1984)
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Abstract

The object of james's theory of truth is knowledge, not truth "qua" correctness. to designate the object of his theory, james avoids using traditional english terminology for correctness but often uses diction typically reserved for knowledge. furthermore, the object of james's theory (as he describes it) cannot be distinguished from knowledge on philosophical grounds

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