A fictionalist theory of universals

In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones (eds.), Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press (2024)
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Abstract

Universals are putative objects like wisdom, morality, redness, etc. Although we believe in properties (which, we argue, are not a kind of object), we do not believe in universals. However, a number of ordinary, natural language constructions seem to commit us to their existence. In this paper, we provide a fictionalist theory of universals, which allows us to speak as if universals existed, whilst denying that any really do.

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Author Profiles

Tim Button
University College London
Robert Trueman
University of York

Citations of this work

Truth without Dependence.Robert Trueman - 2022 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 (1):89-121.

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References found in this work

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Semantics in generative grammar.Irene Heim & Angelika Kratzer - 1998 - Malden, MA: Blackwell. Edited by Angelika Kratzer.
Ontology Made Easy.Amie Lynn Thomasson - 2014 - New York: Oup Usa.
To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
The things we mean.Stephen R. Schiffer - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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