Reichenbach's Theory of Probability and Induction

Review of Metaphysics 4 (3):377 - 393 (1951)
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Abstract

But even with respect to inductive arguments there are a number of different philosophical problems. One is to make explicit the fundamental or most general pattern or patterns of inductive argument. Once these patterns are known a second and third problem arise. The second is to justify man's use of and faith in inductive arguments. And the third is to formulate some general propositions about nature which could reasonably be accepted by users of inductive arguments and which when added to the premises of these arguments make them explicitly deductive.

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Citations of this work

The presupposition theory of induction.Arthur W. Burks - 1953 - Philosophy of Science 20 (3):177-197.
Notes on probability and induction.Rudolf Carnap - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):269 - 298.
Scientific method without metaphysical presuppositions.Herbert Feigl - 1954 - Philosophical Studies 5 (2):17 - 29.

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