Abstract

Some moral philosophers view conventional morality as an instrument that has a certain function to fulfill, and that we can in principle correct or adjust on the basis of an understanding of that function. This instrumentalist approach to morality is an extension of a familiar pattern of thought constituted by the combination of two different elements. We tend, on the one hand, to believe that we have a clear understanding of what it is that we allow ourselves to be guided by when we are motivated by something moral. We identify this moral motivation with something that is, at first sight, transparent and unproblematic, viz. with some sort of altruism. The willingness to act morally is the willingness to be concerned with the happiness, welfare and interests of others.On the other hand, we are also familiar with the idea that traditional or conventional morality is a culturally dependent product of historical processes which have created in us certain beliefs and patterns of feeling and response. The moral judgments that we are inclined to make on the basis of unexamined intuitions owe their existence and appeal, at least partially, to a contingent cultural and historical context.The combination of these two elements leads to a familiar project: we should view whatever is contingent with a critical eye, by determining towhat extent it can be justified on the basis of insight into what is essential . Or to put in another way, we should check if the unexamined, intuitive judgments that we tend to pronounce actually agree with the explicitly formulated universal principles which we consciously endorse.An illustration of this way of thinking can be found in the current discussion about what might be called ‘moral proximity’. The extent to which we feel involved in the joys and sorrows of others depends, among other things, on how near they are to us. This proximity can be conceived in different ways: familiarity, kinship, proximity in space or time. We feel greater sympathy towards our friends or acquaintances than towards people we have never met and about whom we know very little. The suffering of disaster victims in our own country affects us more deeply than the fate of those who experienced the same thing in some distant country. The tragedies of many centuries ago do not horrify us now, and we cannot easily get worked up over the fate of future generations