Abstract

Regardless of the theory of vagueness we adhere to, we all agree that no facts, known or practically knowable, suffice to determine the location of precise boundaries for vague concepts. According to the epistemic theory of vagueness, this ignorance is entirely an epistemic matter—vague concepts have sharp boundaries but we can never know their exact locations. Opposed to epistemicism is a view—or family of views—I shall call indeterminism. The indeterminist agrees with the epistemicist that we lack knowledge of the locations of sharp boundaries to vague concepts but holds that this ignorance has a somewhat more dramatic source—vague concepts have no sharp boundaries for us to have knowledge of. In recent years, the epistemic theory of vagueness has come to joint the various versions of indeterminism as a theory well-enough supported by argument to demand to be taken seriously. In this paper, I shall try to explain why I am unconvinced by the body of argument that has been marshalled in support of epistemicism; I shall try to explain why we should continue to endorse an indeterminist picture of vagueness.