Abstract

The philosophical literature on the moral status of nonhuman animals, which is bounteous, diverse, and sophisticated, contains a glaring omission. There is little discussion of human responsibilities to companion animals, such as dogs and cats. The assumption seems to be that animals are an undifferentiated mass – that whatever responsibilities one has to any animal are had to all animals. It is significant that we do not think this way about humans. Most of us (all but extreme impartialists) acknowledge the existence of special responsibilities to humans. We believe, for instance, that our children, friends, and compatriots have special claims on our attention, time, energy, and resources. This is not at all incompatible (although it is sometimes thought to be) with the view that we have obligations to strangers. My aim in this essay is to fill the lacuna in the literature. I argue that the act of taking an animal into one''s life or home, through purchase, gift, or adoption, generates responsibilities to it, the main one being to provide for its needs, which, in the case of dogs (for example), are many and varied. Since this thesis is shrouded in misconception, I devote part of the essay to clarifying it. I then diagnose its philosophical neglect, which stems from both practical concerns and theoretical commitments. I argue that the practical concerns are groundless and that the theoretical commitments do not have the implications they are thought to have.