In Defense of Epistemic Abstemiousness

Logos and Episteme 2 (2):287-292 (2011)
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Abstract

The principle of suspension says that when you disagree with an epistemic peer about p, you should suspend judgment about p. In “Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts,” Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour, Jonathan Neufeld, and Robert B. Talisse argue against the principle of suspension, claiming that it “is deeply at odds with how we view ourselves as cognitive agents.” I argue that their arguments do not succeed.

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Alex Bundy
University of California at Santa Barbara

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