On the 'standard' argument for fatalism

Philosophical Papers 24 (2):111-125 (1995)
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Abstract

What has sometimes been called the "standard" argument for fatalism never achieved the critical popularity of Richard Taylor's (1962) infamous argument. But it has enjoyed far greater longevity. In De Fato Cicero (1960) tells us it was known in ancient Greece as the "idle argument", for it purports to show the futility of attempting to control one's fate and, hence, those persuaded by it could be led to a life of inaction and idleness. Even with such antiquated credentials, however, the argument continues to exercise fine contemporary minds (e.g. Schlesinger 1993).

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David J. Buller
Northern Illinois University

Citations of this work

Modus Ponens and the Logic of Decision.Nate Charlow - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic.
Looking for the Lazy Argument Candidates.Vladimir Marko - 2011 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 18 (3 & 4):363-383; 447-474.

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References found in this work

Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Conditionals.Frank Jackson (ed.) - 1991 - Oxford University Press.
A causal theory of counterfactuals.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):3 – 21.

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