Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (3):465 – 478 (2009)

Authors
Christopher Buford
University of Akron
Abstract
Bishop Butler objected to Locke's theory of personal identity on the grounds that memory presupposes personal identity. Most of those sympathetic with Locke's account have accepted Butler's criticism, and have sought to devise a theory of personal identity in the spirit of Locke's that avoids Butler's circularity objection. John McDowell has argued that even the more recent accounts of personal identity are vulnerable to the kind of objection Butler raised against Locke's own account. I criticize McDowell's stance, drawing on a distinction introduced by Annalisa Coliva between two types of immunity to error through misidentification.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802257747
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Elements of Episodic Memory.Endel Tulving - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - London, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Memory.Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Identity Over Time.Andre Gallois - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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