A dilemma for the knowledge despite falsehood strategy

Episteme 15 (2):166-182 (2018)
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Abstract

One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.

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Author Profiles

Christopher Michael Cloos
University of California, Santa Barbara
Christopher Buford
University of Akron

References found in this work

What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.
The inescapability of Gettier problems.Linda Zagzebski - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):65-73.
Comment on Paul Boghossian, "What is inference".Crispin Wright - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):27-37.
Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference.Ulf Hlobil - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):419-429.

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