How Should Risk and Ambiguity Affect Our Charitable Giving?

Utilitas 35 (3):175-197 (2023)
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Abstract

Suppose we want to do the most good we can with a particular sum of money, but we cannot be certain of the consequences of different ways of making use of it. This article explores how our attitudes towards risk and ambiguity bear on what we should do. It shows that risk-avoidance and ambiguity-aversion can each provide good reason to divide our money between various charitable organizations rather than to give it all to the most promising one. It also shows how different attitudes towards risk and ambiguity affect whether we should give to an organization which does a small amount of good for certain or to one which does a large amount of good with some small or unknown probability.

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Lara Buchak
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Philosophical foundations for worst-case arguments.Lara Buchak - 2023 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 22 (3):215-242.

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References found in this work

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.
In Defense of Fanaticism.Hayden Wilkinson - 2022 - Ethics 132 (2):445-477.
Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.
Taking Risks on Behalf of Another.Johanna Thoma - 2023 - Philosophy Compass 18 (3):e12898.

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