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Conceptualizing motivation and emotion
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):195-196 (2000)
Abstract
Motivation and emotion are not clearly defined and differentiated in Rolls's The brain and emotion, reflecting a widespread problem in conceptualizing these phenomena. An adequate theory of emotion cannot be based upon reward and punishment alone. Basic mechanisms of arousal, agonistic, and prosocial motives-emotions exist in addition to reward-punishment systems.My notes
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