Responsibility fictionalism

Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This paper develops and defends a revisionary fictionalist version of the ‘social connection model’ of responsibility. The social connection model has become a prominent account of responsibility in recent years but, as many critics have noted, has difficulty in providing an account of the connection required to generate responsibility which is sufficiently determinate and generates acceptable outcomes. In light of this problem, I first consider whether a fictionalist interpretation of Iris Marion Young’s articulation of the social connection model is tenable. I show that no such re-interpretation is possible, as it runs against Young’s explicit aims. I then develop a more thoroughly revisionary fictionalist version of the social connection model. I argue that this form of responsibility fictionalism is able to account for the central aims of the social connection model without succumbing to the issues standard versions of the model face in grounding the attributions of responsibility it generates. Furthermore, I argue that attributions of responsibility can retain motivational force on this view.

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Alexander Bryan
Cambridge University

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