Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):273-291 (2017)

Authors
Mihailis E. Diamantis
University of Iowa
Abstract
Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect.
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DOI 10.1007/s10506-017-9214-9
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References found in this work BETA

Realism, Mathematics and Modality.Hartry Field - 1988 - Philosophical Topics 16 (1):57-107.
The Myth of Morality.Richard Joyce - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.
The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
Truth.Alexis G. Burgess & John P. Burgess - 2011 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Welcoming Robots Into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.John Danaher - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2023-2049.
Ethics of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics.Vincent C. Müller - 2020 - In Edward Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Palo Alto, Cal.: CSLI, Stanford University. pp. 1-70.

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