Direct Reference and Belief Attributions

Dissertation, The University of British Columbia (Canada) (1990)
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Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to provide a non-Fregean account of the functioning of belief attributions , specifically those of the form 'B believes that Fa' where 'a' is a proper name, which provides a satisfactory account of the phenomena associated with the substitution of co-referential names and with the use of vacuous names. ;After an initial study of non-Fregean theories of reference in which Kaplan's introduction of the singular proposition is found to be necessary, an examination of certain proposed solutions for BA's, compatable with direct reference, is carried out. These proposals are all found wanting due to their being, ultimately, Fregean. ;A non-Fregean approach is initiated by examining our actual practices in using BA's. It is found that very different information can be conveyed by the use of the same sentence in the same context and that this differing information can be captured by treating the BA as an answer to a question. Belnap's logic of questions and answers is developed to encompass vacuous terms and, with this in place, two distinct uses of BA's emerge. In one, the BA is used to provide a direct answer to the question; in the other it is used to provide a tentative answer. ;Problematic cases of BA's are then examined. It is found that substitution in all cases is permissible. Supposed difficulties with this position for belief and for the explanation of action are resolved, partly by means of the development and application of an account of 'why' questions and answers. ;The use of vacuous names is then investigated and a difference noted between cases of tentative answers and those of direct answers. Regarding the former, the use of a vacuous name results in no answer being given. However, given the nature of tentative answers, no problems specific to belief attributions are generated. In order to deal with cases where the vacuous name occurs in a BA asserted as a direct answer, Evans' account of pretend games, though modified to permit a possible world account of counterfactuals, is invoked

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