Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221 (1986)

John Fischer
University of California, Riverside
It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being - adult or child - toward the prospect of his death is different; it is not unreasonable in certain cases to regard one's own death as a bad thing for oneself. If this is so, then the question arises as to why death is bad, in those cases in which it is bad.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/bf00354589
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,337
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Against Time Bias.Preston Greene & Meghan Sullivan - 2015 - Ethics 125 (4):947-970.
A Dilemma for Epicureanism.Travis Timmerman - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):241-257.
Fitting Attitudes and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2008 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 3:47-73.

View all 53 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
352 ( #29,274 of 2,508,112 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #89,100 of 2,508,112 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes