Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):443-463 (2020)

Daniele Bruno
Universität Potsdam
This paper discusses the prospects of a comprehensive philosophical account of promising that relies centrally on the notion of trust. I lay out the core idea behind the Trust View, showing how it convincingly explains the normative contours and the unique value of our promissory practice. I then sketch three distinct options of how the Trust View can explain the normativity of promises. First, an effect based-view, second, a view drawing on a wider norm demanding respect to those whom one has invited to something, and finally, as a new suggestion, a Normative Interest View. This view holds that promising is a normative power that serves our interest in facilitating or enabling the relationship of trust between promisor and promisee. I argue that only those embracing the third view can fully account for the distinctive obligation that results from the giving of a valid promise in all cases.
Keywords Promising  Normative Powers  Trust
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqz086
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Trust and Antitrust.Annette Baier - 1986 - Ethics 96 (2):231-260.
Shaping the Normative Landscape.David Owens - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Trust as an Affective Attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.

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Citations of this work BETA

Are All Practical Reasons Based on Value?Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.

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