The characteristic thesis of anti-individualism

Analysis 55 (3):146-48 (1995)
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Abstract

This is a response to an argument (by Michael McKinsey) purporting to show that anti-individualism is trivially true. I show that this argument rests upon a misconception of the basic claim of anti-individualism

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10.1093/analys/55.3.146

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Citations of this work

Forms of externalism and privileged access.Michael McKinsey - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:199-224.
The semantic basis of externalism.Michael McKinsey - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Pro Universitaria.
Externalism, self-knowledge, and inner observation.Harold Langsam - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):42-61.

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References found in this work

A Modal Argument for Narrow Content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.

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