Second-Order Preferences and Instrumental Rationality

Acta Analytica 26 (4):367-385 (2011)
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Abstract

A second-order preference is a preference over preferences. This paper addresses the role that second-order preferences play in a theory of instrumental rationality. I argue that second-order preferences have no role to play in the prescription or evaluation of actions aimed at ordinary ends. Instead, second-order preferences are relevant to prescribing or evaluating actions only insofar as those actions have a role in changing or maintaining first-order preferences. I establish these claims by examining and rejecting the view that second-order preferences trump first-order preferences. I also examine and reject the view that second-order preferences give additional normative force to an agent’s preferred first-order preferences. I conclude by arguing that second-order preferences should be integrated into an agent’s object-level preference ordering, and by explaining how best to make sense of this integration

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Donald W. Bruckner
University of Pittsburgh (PhD)

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References found in this work

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Morals by agreement.David P. Gauthier - 1986 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.

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