Minority (dis)advantage in population games

Synthese 196 (1):413-427 (2019)
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Abstract

We identify a novel ‘cultural red king effect’ that, in many cases, results in stable arrangements which are to the detriment of minority groups. In particular, we show inequalities disadvantaging minority groups can naturally arise under an adaptive process when minority and majority members must routinely determine how to divide resources amongst themselves. We contend that these results show how inequalities disadvantaging minorities can likely arise by dint of their relative size and need not be a result of either explicit nor implicit prejudices, nor due to intrinsic differences between minority and majority members.

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Justin Bruner
University of Arizona

References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.

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