Hinge propositions and epistemic justification

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (3):285–287 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Michael Williams and Crispin Wright have claimed that we are epistemically justified in believing hinge propositions, such as there is an external world. In a recent paper Allan Hazlett puts forward an argument that purports to elucidate the source of such justification. This paper reconstructs Hazlett's argument and offers a criticism of it.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Structural Justification.Robert Audi - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:473-492.
Propositional justification, evidence, and the cost of error.Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216.
Is apriority context-sensitive?Nenad Miščević - 2005 - Acta Analytica 20 (1):55-80.
A paradox of justified believing.Colin Cheyne - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
Causal reference and epistemic justification.Jane Duran - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (2):272-279.
How to defeat belief in the external world.Allan Hazlett - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
122 (#144,260)

6 months
5 (#652,053)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

References found in this work

How to defeat belief in the external world.Allan Hazlett - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2):198–212.

Add more references