How mixed strategies make a difference in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma

Analysis (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Mixed strategies – where one opts to randomize one’s decision – are thought to be of minimal significance in the one-shot prisoner’s dilemma. We argue against this commonsense view. Mixed strategies play a role in the emergence of cooperation and can even stabilize some level of cooperation under conditions where cooperation was previously thought impossible.

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2024-11-02

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