- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
The Value of a Person
Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 68 (1):167 - 198 (1994)
Abstract
(for Adam Morton's half) I argue that if we take the values of persons to be ordered in a way that allows incomparability, then the problems Broome raises have easy solutions. In particular we can maintain that creating people is morally neutral while killing them has a negative value.Author Profiles
My notes
Similar books and articles
Why there is no concept of a person. in Gill, ed. *the person and the human mind*:.Adam Morton - 1989 - In Christopher Gill (ed.), Ancient and Modern Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press.
Egalitarianism and Repugnant Conclusions.Thomas Søbirk Petersen - 2003 - Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 38 (1):115-125.
Repugnance or Intransitivity: A Repugnant But Forced Choice.Stuart Rachels - 2004 - In Jesper Ryberg Torbjorn Tannsjo (ed.), The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 163--86.
Why there is no concept of a person.Adam Morton - 1990 - In Christopher Gill (ed.), The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Can it ever be better never to have existed at all? Person-based consequentialism and a new repugnant conclusion.Melinda A. Roberts - 2003 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 20 (2):159–185.
Contrastive knowledge.Antti Karjalainen & Adam Morton - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):74 – 89.
Does the total principle have any repugnant implications?Douglas W. Portmore - 1999 - Ratio 12 (1):80–98.
The Very Repugnant Conclusion.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 29-44.
Analytics
Added to PP
2011-05-29
Downloads
689 (#22,638)
6 months
76 (#55,088)
2011-05-29
Downloads
689 (#22,638)
6 months
76 (#55,088)
Historical graph of downloads
Author Profiles
Citations of this work
Better never to have been believed: Benatar on the harm of existence.Campbell Brown - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):45-52.
Prioritarianism for Variable Populations.Campbell Brown - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):325-361.
A consequentialist account of Narveson’s dictum.John Cusbert & Robyn Kath - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1693-1709.
Social choice and normative population theory: A person affecting solution to Parfit's mere addition paradox.Clark Wolf - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):263 - 282.
References found in this work
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6d9b7f7c4c-v4fj8 uwo