Two Versions of Hume's Law

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):2-7 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Moral conclusions cannot validly be inferred from nonmoral premises – this principle, commonly called “Hume’s law,” presents a conundrum. On one hand, it seems obviously true, and its truth is often simply taken for granted. On the other hand, an ingenious argument by A. N. Prior seems to refute it. My aim here is a resolution. I shall argue, first, that Hume’s law is ambiguous, admitting both a strong and a weak interpretation; second, that the strong interpretation is false, as shown by Prior’s argument; and, third, that the weak interpretation is true.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,593

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-10-13

Downloads
288 (#64,279)

6 months
16 (#109,309)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Campbell Brown
London School of Economics

Citations of this work

Laying Down Hume's Law.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):24-46.
Ruling out solutions to Prior’s dilemma for Hume’s law.Aaron Wolf - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):84-93.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Studies in the way of words.Herbert Paul Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Plural predication.Thomas J. McKay - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The autonomy of ethics.A. N. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38 (3):199 – 206.
Logic and the autonomy of ethics.Charles R. Pigden - 1989 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (2):127 – 151.
The Autonomy of Ethics.A. Prior - 1960 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 38:197.

View all 10 references / Add more references