Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 32 (6):585 – 618 (2007)

A higher order potential analysis of moral status clarifies the issues that divide Human Being Theorists who oppose embryo research from Person Theorists who favor embryo research. Higher order potential personhood is transitive if it is active, identity preserving and morally relevant. If the transition from the Second Order Potential of the embryo to the First Order Potential of an infant is transitive, opponents of embryo research make a powerful case for the moral status of the embryo. If it is intransitive, then the Person Theorist can draw lines between levels of moral status that permit embryo research to proceed.
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DOI 10.1080/03605310701680973
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Substance Ontology Cannot Determine the Moral Status of Embryos.J. Morris - 2012 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (4):331-350.
The Constitution of the Human Embryo as Substantial Change.David Alvargonzález - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (2):172-191.
Phenomenology of Pregnancy and the Ethics of Abortion.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2018 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 21 (1):77-87.
Dignity, Health, and Membership: Who Counts as One of Us?Bryan C. Pilkington - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (2):115-129.

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