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Secondary qualities and representation
Analysis 52 (3):174-179 (1992)
Abstract
Secondary qualities have peculiarities which are thought to threaten physicalism. It is argued that these peculiarities are only to be expected in a physicalist universe in virtue of the essential characteristics of a representing device. Any device representing the world such as a camera will have depictional qualities. Secondary qualities are a subset of theseLinks
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Citations of this work
How to solve the hard problem: A predictable inexplicability.David Brooks - 2000 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 6:5-20.
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