Preferring to Decrease One's Own Well-Being

Utilitas 29 (1):52-64 (2017)
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Abstract

Many scholars have argued that well-being is the satisfaction of preferences, or of fully informed preferences, or of fully informed preferences about one's own life. But none of those theories can be true if it is possible to prefer, with full information, to decrease one's own well-being. And because it is possible to have such a preference, those theories cannot be true.

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10.1017/s0953820816000212

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Facts and Values.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (2):5-31.
A Theory of the Good and the Right.Richard B. Brandt - 1979 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 35 (2):307-310.

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