AbstractDavies and Wright have recently diagnosed the felt inadequacy of Moore’s response to the sceptic in terms of a failure of transmission of warrant. They argue that warrant fails to transmit across the following key inference: I have hands, if I have hands then I am not a BIV, so I am not a BIV, on the grounds that this inference cannot be used to rationally overcome doubt about its conclusion, and cannot strengthen one’s epistemic position with respect to the conclusion. Here, for the sake of argument, I grant that the inference can neither rationally overcome doubt about its conclusion nor strengthen one’s epistemic position with respect to the conclusion, and examine whether, and in what way, this undermines..
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