Narrow mental content

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
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Abstract

Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined by the individual's intrinsic properties

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Curtis Brown
Trinity University

Citations of this work

The Metaphysics of Emergence.Richard Campbell - 2015 - Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.
The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.
Is Narrow Content's "Narrow Content" Narrow Content?David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Propositions, Meaning, and Names.Tristan Grøtvedt Haze - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (3):335-362.

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References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The representational character of experience.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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