No Argument against the Continuity of Value: Reply to Dorsey

Utilitas 22 (4):494-496 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Dorsey rejects Conclusion, so he believes he must reject one of the premises. He argues that the best option is to reject Premise 3. Rejecting Premise 3 entails a certain sort of discontinuity in value. So Dorsey believes he has an argument for discontinuity

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,349

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Dualism and the argument from continuity.Eric Russert Kraemer & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (January):55-59.
How (not) to attack the luck argument.E. J. Coffman - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):157-166.
Quinton's Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism.Silvio Seno Chibeni - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):393 - 400.
Disappearance and knowledge.Andrew D. Cling - 1990 - Philosophy of Science 57 (2):226-47.
Discussions Quinton’s Neglected Argument for Scientific Realism.Silvio Seno Chibeni - 2005 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (2):393-400.
Reconsidering Bohr's reply to EPR.Hans Halvorson & Rob Clifton - 2001 - In T. Placek & J. Butterfield (eds.), Non-locality and Modality. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3--18.
Characterising Near Continuity Constructively.Douglas Bridges & Luminiţa Vîţă - 2001 - Mathematical Logic Quarterly 47 (4):535-538.
A reply to McLachlan.J. Keown - 1998 - Journal of Medical Ethics 24 (4):255-256.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-23

Downloads
114 (#152,686)

6 months
9 (#290,637)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Broome
University Of Oxford

Citations of this work

Against internalism.Kieran Setiya - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):266–298.
Moral priorities under risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):793-811.
Explanatory Injustice and Epistemic Agency.Veli Mitova - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):707-722.

View all 14 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references