Utilitas 22 (3):303-308 (2010)

Authors
Saul Smilansky
University of Haifa
Abstract
I point out an odd consequence of the role that broadly pragmatic considerations regularly play in determining moral demands. As a result of the way in which moral demands are formed, it turns out that people will frequently become morally good in a strange and rather dubious way. Because human beings are not very good, we will lower our moral demands and, as a result, most people will turn out, in an important sense, to be morally good. Our relative badness, by giving us good reasons to limit moral demands, makes us morally good
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DOI 10.1017/S095382081000021X
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