Just Kidding Folks! An Expressivist Analysis of Humor
Abstract
In this paper, I will to lay down what I call an expressivist account of the pragmatics of jokes, through which I wish to shed light on the function of offensive jokes in particular. I will focus specifically on jokes, not humor more generally. Jokes are particular sorts of speech-acts; and although many may be issued in the form of declarative or interrogative sentences, they are not reducible to them. I suggest here that their analysis must be understood in terms of the unique pragmatic roles that they play. Following this I turn to offensive jokes in particular, describing some of the conditions relevant to their uptake. I will argue that there is a degree of entitlement to certain jokes, and set of commitments that follow from a given joke—both of which are necessary to understand the difference between a context in which a joke is offensive and one in which a similar joke may be merely not funny. I conclude by outlining how on my account we can understand the role of offensive humor as a mode of social criticism.