Husserl on Memory

The Monist 59 (1):40-62 (1975)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The point of departure for husserl's mature account of memory is his rejection of the traditional view that what is immediately and directly experienced in memory is a present image or replica of what is past and not what is past itself. Husserl rejects the image theory on logical and descriptive grounds, Arguing that memory is a direct consciousness of the past. Memory is experienced as a unique mode of consciousness giving its object in a manner irreducible to pictorial or perceptual modes. Husserl's exploration of memory thus understood includes discussion of the differing temporal determinations of memory and its object, Of memory's relation to the absolute time-Constituting flow of consciousness, Of memory as representation of earlier perception, And of the various senses and ways in which empty memorial intentions can be brought to fulfillment.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 105,925

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-01-09

Downloads
184 (#138,197)

6 months
18 (#170,045)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

Self-identity and personal identity.John J. Drummond - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (2):235-247.
Collaborative Inhibition: A Phenomenological Perspective.Daniel Gyollai - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
Regret and the Consciousness of the Past.Patrick Eldridge - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (5):646-663.

View all 12 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references