Facing death from a safe distance: saṃvega and moral psychology

Journal of Buddhist Ethics 23:83-128 (2016)
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Abstract

Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that -- according to Buddhaghosa -- should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega -- what it is and how it works -- based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two" systems" : the experiential, automatic system 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight in suffering produce moral motivation.

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Lajos L. Brons
University of Groningen (PhD)

Citations of this work

The recognition of nothingness.James Baillie - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2585-2603.
Philosophy of mental time — A theme introduction.Lajos Brons & Takashi Iida - 2019 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 28:1-8.

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References found in this work

Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
Against alief.Eric Mandelbaum - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):197-211.
The self as a center of narrative gravity.Daniel C. Dennett - 1992 - In Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole & D. L. Johnson (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 4--237.

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