Authors
Curtis Brown
Trinity University
Abstract
Belief states are only contingently connected with the objects of belief. Burge's examples show that the same belief state can be associated with different objects of belief. Kripke's puzzle shows that the same object of belief can be associated with different belief states. Nevertheless, belief states can best be characterized by a subset of the propositions one believes, namely those one directly or immediately believes. The rest of the things one believes are believed indirectly, by virtue of one's direct beliefs. This distinction sheds light on Kripke's puzzle, the problem of the contingent a priori, and the problem of logical omniscience.
Keywords belief state  object of belief  Kripke's puzzle  contingent a priori
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.2307/2107937
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References found in this work BETA

Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
Mental Representation.Hartry Field - 1978 - Erkenntnis 13 (July):9-61.
Beyond Belief.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - In Andrew Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Narrow Mental Content.Curtis Brown - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Nominalism, Trivialism, Logicism.Agustín Rayo - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (1):nku013.
Rationality and Puzzling Beliefs.Neil Feit - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):29 - 55.

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