Erkenntnis 79 (4):733-754 (2014)

I argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit problem
Keywords Epistemic luck  Direction of fit  Duncan Pritchard  Safety  Virtue epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-013-9551-3
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Purifying Impure Virtue Epistemology.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):385-410.

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