A Puzzle about Properties

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):635-650 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid. But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestion that properties are the semantic values of predicates.

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
380 (#47,988)

6 months
50 (#73,711)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

How to Define Theoretical Terms.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 36 (2):321-321.
Kinds, general terms, and rigidity: A reply to LaPorte.Stephen P. Schwartz - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (3):265 - 277.
A puzzle about ontology.Thomas Hofweber - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):256–283.
Propositions.Matthew McGrath - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 8 references / Add more references