Hypnotic ingroup–outgroup suggestion influences economic decision-making in an Ultimatum Game

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):939-946 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Studies in economic decision-making have demonstrated that individuals appreciate social values supporting equity and disapprove unfairness when distributing goods between two or more parties. However, this seems to critically depend on psychological mechanisms partly pertaining to the ingroup–outgroup distinction. Little is known as to what extent economic bargaining can be manipulated by means of psychological interventions such has hypnosis. Here we show that a hypnotic ingroup versus outgroup suggestion impacts the tolerance of unfairness in an Ultimatum Game. Specifically, the ingroup suggestion was associated with significantly greater acceptance rates of unfair offers than the outgroup suggestion, whereas hypnosis alone exerted only small effects on unfairness tolerance. These findings indicate that psychological interventions such as hypnotic suggestion can contribute to ingroup favoritism and outgroup rejection



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 83,890

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

25 (#493,428)

6 months
1 (#503,386)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Anna Welpinghus
Ruhr-Universität Bochum
Albert Newen
Ruhr-Universität Bochum

References found in this work

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism.Robert L. Trivers - 1971 - Quarterly Review of Biology 46 (1):35-57.

Add more references