Understanding Strength of Will

In Fabio Bacchini Massimo Dell'Utri & Stefano Caputo (eds.), New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 165-178 (2014)
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Abstract

Richard Holton has presented an important criticism of two prominent accounts of action, a criticism that employs a notion of strength of will. Holton claims that these well-known accounts of action cannot explain cases in which an agent adheres to the dictates of a previous resolution in spite of a persistent desire to the contrary. In this chapter, I present an explanation and defense of Holton’s criticism of these accounts of action, and then I argue that while Holton highlights a crucial deficiency in both, his own explanation of strength of will is problematic.

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Michael Brent
Columbia University (PhD)

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References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):461-481.
Intention and Weakness of Will.Richard Holton - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):241.
7. What Happens When Someone Acts?J. David Velleman - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press. pp. 188-210.
Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.

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