The theory ladenness of the mental processes used in the scientific enterprise: Evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science. In R. W. Proctor & E. J. Capaldi (Eds.). Psychology of science: Implicit and explicit processes (289-334). New York: Oxford University Press
Oxford University Press (
2012)
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Abstract
This chapter takes a naturalized approach to the philosophy of science using evidence from cognitive psychology and from the history of science. It first describes the problem of the theory ladenness of perception. Then it provides a general top-down/bottom-up framework from cognitive psychology that is used to organize and evaluate the evidence for theory ladenness throughout the process of carrying out science (perception, attention, thinking, experimenting, memory, and communication). The chapter highlights both the facilitatory and inhibitory role of theory in the scientific process. Both the historical record and the evidence from cognitive psychology suggest that the top-down factors have their greatest impact when the bottom-up information is weak or degraded. There is a short discussion of the normative implications of the material in the chapter for carrying out science.