Abstract

In this dissertation, it is investigated what role cognitive science is to play in a thoroughly naturalized epistemology and philosophy of science. The dissertation consists of four parts. In part I, the aim is to investigate what research questions and methods are valid in a naturalized approach to issues in epistemology and philosophy of science. This part contains a critical discussion of contemporary naturalistic approaches, in particular the cognitive approaches of Alvin Goldman, Paul Thagard, Paul Churchland, and Ron Giere. Following this discussion, a number of descriptive, explanatory and normative projects in epistemology and the philosophy of science is outlined, and it is investigated how these are best approached methodologically. ;In part II, the aim is to investigate the proper relation between cognitive and sociological approaches in the study of knowledge. I begin with an assessment of the reducibility of aspects of science to cognitive states and processes, implying that their descriptive analysis is a task of a cognitive philosophy of science. Next, the role of social and cognitive factors in the explanation and in the evaluation of knowledge states and processes is examined. Finally, I analyze cognitive and sociological methodologies in the study of science, in particular those of Thagard, Giere, David Bloor and Steve Woolgar, and outline my own methodology. ;In Part III, a cognitive framework is outlined for a cognitive epistemology and philosophy of science. This framework integrates connectionist approaches in cognitive science with enactivist approaches and work in schema theory and cognitive model theory. ;In part IV, this cognitive framework is applied in an investigation of the structure and function of theoretical knowledge. I begin with a general analysis of the theoretical structure of knowledge. Next, I investigate various theoretical functions: prediction, descriptive-analysis, explanation and unification, and analyze these in terms of the problem-solving abilities they confer. Next, I propose a cognitive account of scientific theories that integrates model-theoretic and Kuhnian perspectives, and assigns a central role to iconic models in science. Finally, I propose cognitive-pragmatic analyses of realism, truth, and epistemic virtue