A Philosopher Looks at the Insanity Defense

Dissertation, Temple University (1986)
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Abstract

This dissertation considers many of the recent, major lines of attack against the insanity defense. The goal of the dissertation is to establish that these attacks fail. We seek to provide a philosophical defense for the insanity defense. ;In Part One we consider attacks against the concept of insanity or mental illness. Chapter One examines arguments against insanity put forth by so-called radical psychiatrists like Thomas Szasz. We learn that these psychiatrists fail to show that insanity is a mere myth. Next, in Chapter Two we attempt to provide at least an initial understanding of insanity. Relying on the works of Herbert Fingarette, we conclude that insanity consists of an incapacity for rationality. ;We turn our attention in Part Two to attacks against insanity as an excusing condition. Chapter Three explores the relationship between insanity and responsibility. There, we discover that insanity very often does not result in ignorance or involuntariness. However, in a more fundamental sense, some forms of insanity do involve a lack of responsibility. It is argued that a separate legal defense of insanity is required to provide psychopaths with an excuse for wrongdoing. Chapter Four explores the connection between insanity and mens rea or criminal intent. Our exploration of this connection reveals that the psychopath's insanity prevents him from freely forming his mens rea of his own accord. We argue that in legal contexts the question of how mens rea was formed is more important than the question of its presence or absence. ;Finally, in Part Three we examine attacks against excuses in general. Chapter Five considers the concepts of an excuse and an accusation of criminal wrongdoing. It is argued that a consideration of what an excuse is, and what an accusation is shows that the criminal law must continue to recognize excuses. In Chapter Six we consider the case against excuses that has been put forth most powerfully by Barbara Wootton. We learn that Wootton has been unable to show that the criminal law would be well-advised to abandon all excuses

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