Whole-Life Welfarism

American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (1):63-74 (2014)
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Abstract

In this paper, I set out and defend a new theory of value, whole-life welfarism. According to this theory, something is good only if it makes somebody better off in some way in his life considered as a whole. By focusing on lifetime, rather than momentary, well-being, a welfarist can solve two of the most vexing puzzles in value theory, The Badness of Death and The Problem of Additive Aggregation.

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Ben Bramble
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Consequentialism about Meaning in Life.Ben Bramble - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (4):445-459.
The Passing of Temporal Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2017 - New York, NY: Routledge.
Is pleasure all that is good about experience?Willem Deijl - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1-19.
Accounting for the Harm of Death.Duncan Purves - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):89-112.
Ways to Be Worse Off.Ian Stoner - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (4):921-949.

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Weighing lives.John Broome - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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