Comparing evaluations

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):85-100 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper explores the problem of comparing the strengths of different individual's attitudes, and especially their evaluative attitudes, by looking at how measures of these quantities are obtained. I argue that comparisons of both strengths of belief and relative strengths of preference and desire are justified by the causal role they play in the production of action.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
98 (#170,891)

6 months
6 (#431,022)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Bradley
London School of Economics

References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Problems of rationality.Donald Davidson (ed.) - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical papers.Frank Plumpton Ramsey - 1925 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by D. H. Mellor.
Social Choice and Individual Values.Irving M. Copi - 1952 - Science and Society 16 (2):181-181.

View all 13 references / Add more references