Abstract

In Die Vollendung des deutschen Idealismus in der Spätphilosophie Schellings, W. Schulz concludes that the project of German idealism reaches its fulfilment in Schelling's later philosophy, in such a way that the project itself is abandoned. Schulz defines it as an attempt to conceive pure subjectivity in terms of sheer self-mediation. This project, which Schelling consistently carries through, results in the insight that pure subjectivity (identified by Schulz with pure reason) is itself mediated. In this awareness pure subjectivity experiences its finitude. Against Schulz's position I want to posit that the project of German idealism and especially the project of Schelling's philosophy should preferably be defined as an attempt to understand reason as constituted by freedom. Precisely because Schulz does not systematically take into account this constitutive position of freedom, he misses some essential aspects in Schelling's thinking. Schelling indeed conceives of the primacy of freedom in two ways : it is both the theoretical ground and the practical aim of reason. This implies that reason is not only constituted by freedom, but that it is also directed towards its realization. Yet, although these dimensions of freedom are both constitutive of reason, they do not belong to it. This idea of freedom as both constitutive and external to pure reason, obviously leads to Schulz's thesis that a mere self-mediation of pure subjectivity is impossible. But whereas Schulz argues that Schelling does not reach such insight until his later philosophy, I would say that it was already present when Schelling acknowledged the formative position of freedom — an idea which he put forward at the very beginning of his philosophical evolution. By thus narrowing the problem of Schelling's philosophy, Schulz cannot possibly understand the specific role and meaning of the positive philosophy in Schelling's later thinking. For this role is completely based on the idea that philosophy is oriented towards the realization of an ethical praxis. In this article I try to show how Schelling understands this primacy of freedom : firstly, he conceives freedom as the ground of all reasoning via a transcendental reconstruction of the relationship between freedom and reason ; secondly, he legitimates the realization of freedom as the aim of all reasoning by postulating the final unity of reason and freedom as the ultimate goal of history. More specifically, I discuss how the distinction in Schelling's later thought between negative and positive philosophy clearly reflects this concept of philosophy