The referee’s dilemma. The ethics of scientific communities and game theory

Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74 (2002)
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This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. Namely, on the basis of the generally accepted dictum of scientific endeavor as the pursuit of knowledge exclusively for knowledge’s sake, scientifically »right« behavior is seen to be clearly defined and distinguishable from scientifically »wrong« behavior. After elucidating the basic principles of game theory, the article illustrates – by using imaginary and real cases, as well as some views from the philosophyof biology (the units of selection debate) – how this sort of reasoning could be applied in an analysis of the functioning of science

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Tomislav Bracanovic
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb

Citations of this work

Game Theory in Philosophy.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2005 - Topoi 24 (2):197-208.

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References found in this work

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Objective Knowledge.K. R. Popper - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):388-398.
The Oxford dictionary of philosophy.Simon Blackburn - 1996 - Oxford ;: Oxford University Press.
Philosophy of Biology.Sergio Sismondo - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):164.

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