The non-triviality of dialectical set theory

In Graham Priest, Richard Routley & Jean Norman (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 437--470 (1989)
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Citations of this work

Paraconsistent logic.Graham Priest - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Dialetheism.Francesco Berto, Graham Priest & Zach Weber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2018 (2018).
What Is an Inconsistent Truth Table?Zach Weber, Guillermo Badia & Patrick Girard - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):533-548.

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