Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects

American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):72 (2009)
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Abstract

The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis. The Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler’s Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life is selected for observation. Once we take account of the procedure, we find that the support for the Many Universe hypothesis remains.

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Darren Bradley
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Confirmation in a Branching World: The Everett Interpretation and Sleeping Beauty.Darren Bradley - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):323-342.
Did the universe design itself?Philip Goff - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (1):99-122.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
The Design Argument.Elliott Sober - 2019 - Cambridge University Press.
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):498-500.

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